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Abstract
Despite the rapid progress of the techniques for image
classification, video annotation has remained a challenging
task. Automated video annotation would be a breakthrough
technology, enabling users to search within the videos. Re-
cently, Google introduced the Cloud Video Intelligence API
for video analysis. As per the website, the system can be
used to “separate signal from noise, by retrieving relevant
information at the video, shot or per frame” level. A demon-
stration website has been also launched, which allows any-
one to select a video for annotation. The API then detects
the video labels (objects within the video) as well as shot
labels (description of the video events over time).
In this paper, we examine the usability of the Google’s
Cloud Video Intelligence API in adversarial environments.
In particular, we investigate whether an adversary can sub-
tly manipulate a video in such a way that the API will return
only the adversary-desired labels. For this, we select an im-
age, which is different from the video content, and insert it,
periodically and at a very low rate, into the video. We found
that if we insert one image every two seconds, the API is de-
ceived into annotating the video as if it only contained the
inserted image. Note that the modification to the video is
hardly noticeable as, for instance, for a typical frame rate
of 25, we insert only one image per 50 video frames. We
also found that, by inserting one image per second, all the
shot labels returned by the API are related to the inserted
image. We perform the experiments on the sample videos
provided by the API demonstration website and show that
our attack is successful with different videos and images.
1. Introduction
In recent years, machine learning techniques have been
extensively deployed for computer vision tasks, particularly
recognizing objects in images [1–4]. However, using ma-
chine learning for annotating videos has remained a chal-
lenging task, due to the temporal aspect of video data and
the difficulty of collecting sufficient well-tagged training
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Figure 1: Illustration of the image insertion attack on
Google’s Cloud Video Intelligence API. The adversary
chooses an image and inserts it, periodically and at a very
low rate, into the video. Our experimental results show that,
by inserting the image once every second, we can deceive
the API to output only the labels of the inserted image for
both the video and shot labels.
samples [5–7]. Due to the growth of video data on the In-
ternet, automatic video annotation has gained a lot of atten-
tion from the research community [8–10], as well as com-
panies such as Facebook [11] and Twitter [12]. Automatic
video annotation can enable searching the videos for a spe-
cific event, which is helpful in applications such as video
surveillance or returning the search results on the web. It
can be also used for prescanning user videos, for example in
YouTube and Facebook, where distribution of certain types
of illegal contents is not permitted.
Recently, Google introduced the Cloud Video Intelli-
gence API for video analysis [13]. A demonstration web-
site has been launched which allows anyone to select a
video stored in Google Cloud Storage for annotation [14].
The API then quickly identifies the video labels which are
the key objects within the video. It also detects the scene
changes and provides shot labels as the detailed description
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of the video events over time. Similar to other Google’s
machine learning APIs, the Cloud Video Intelligence API
is made available to developers to build applications that
can automatically search within the videos [13]. Hence, the
API has the potential to simplify the video understanding
and enable searching in videos just as text documents.
Machine learning systems are typically designed and
developed with the implicit assumption that they will
be deployed in benign settings. However, many works
have pointed out their vulnerability in adversarial environ-
ments [15–18]. Security evaluation of machine learning
systems is an emerging field of study. In [19], Carlini et
al. showed that voice interfaces can be attacked with hidden
voice commands that are unintelligible to humans, but are
interpreted as commands by devices. In [20], Sharif et al.
proposed techniques for physically realizable image modi-
fication to attack face-recognition systems. Recently, Hos-
seini et al. showed that the Google’s Perspective API for
detecting toxic comments can be defeated by subtly modi-
fying the input text [21].
In this paper, we examine the usability of the Google’s
Cloud Video Intelligence API in adversarial environments.
In particular, we investigate whether an adversary can de-
ceive the API into returning only the adversary-desired la-
bels, by slightly manipulating the input video. Such vul-
nerability will seriously undermine the performance of the
video annotation system in real-world applications. For ex-
ample, a search engine may wrongly suggest manipulated
videos to users, or a video filtering system can be bypassed
by slightly modifying a video which has illegal contents.
For manipulating the videos, we select an image, differ-
ent from the video content, and insert it, periodically and
at a very low rate, into the video. Our experimental results
show that by inserting the image once every two seconds,
the API is deceived into returning only the video labels
which are related the inserted image. Note that the mod-
ification to the video is hardly noticeable as, for instance,
for a typical frame rate of 25, we insert only one image per
50 video frames. We also found that by inserting one im-
age per second, all the shot labels returned by the API are
related to the inserted image. We perform the experiments
on the sample videos provided by the API demonstration
website and with different images. Figure 1 illustrates the
image insertion attack on the Google’s Cloud Video Intelli-
gence API.
2. Google’s Cloud Video Intelligence API
The Google’s Cloud Video Intelligence API is designed
for video understanding and analysis. It enables the de-
velopers to easily search and discover the video content by
providing information about entities (nouns or verbs) in the
video and when they occur within the video. It was noted
in [14] that the system can be used to “separates signal from
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Figure 2: The four images (a) a car, (b) a building, (c) a
food plate, and (d) a laptop, that were used in experiments
for inserting within the sample videos.
noise, by retrieving relevant information at the video, shot
or per frame” level. The API uses deep-learning models,
built using frameworks such as TensorFlow and applied on
large-scale media platforms such as YouTube [13].
The system is said to be helpful for large media compa-
nies to better understand the video data, and for media or-
ganizations and consumer technology companies, who want
to build their media catalogs or find easy ways to manage
crowd-sourced content [13]. The underlying technology
can be also used to improve the video recommendations,
as it enables the search engines to consider the video con-
tent, beyond the metadata like descriptions and comments,
for searches.
3. The Image Insertion Attack
In this section, we describe the image insertion attack
for deceiving the Google’s Cloud Video Intelligence API.
The goal of the attack is to modify a given video in such
a way that a human observer would perceive its original
content, but the API returns only the adversary-desired an-
notations. We performed the experiments with three sam-
ple videos “Animals.mp4”, “GoogleFiber.mp4” and “Jane-
Goodall.mp4”, which are provided by the demonstration
website of the Google’s Cloud Video Intelligence API [14].
The API provides video labels (objects in the entire video),
shot changes (scene changes within the video) and shot la-
bels (description of the video events over time).
The attack procedure is as follows. We first tested the
API with sample videos and verified that the API did in-
deed accurately detect both the video and shot labels. For
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Table 1: Demonstration of the Image Insertion Attack on the Google’s Cloud Video Intelligence API. We performed the
experiments with three sample videos provided by the API website [14]. The images are inserted once every two seconds
within the video, which is equal to inserting one image per 50 video frames for a typical frame rate of 25. For each of the
input videos and inserted images, the table shows the video label with the highest confidence returned by the API.
Video Name Inserted Image Video Label Returned by API
(Confidence Score)
“Animals.mp4”
“Car” Audi (98%)
“Building” Building (89%)
“Food Plate” Pasta (99%)
“Laptop” Laptop (91%)
“GoogleFiber.mp4”
“Car” Audi (98%)
“Building” Classical architecture (95%)
“Food Plate” Noodle (99%)
“Laptop” Laptop (91%)
“JaneGoodall.mp4”
“Car” Audi (98%)
“Building” Classical architecture (95%)
“Food Plate” Pasta (99%)
“Laptop” Laptop (91%)
example, for the “Animals.mp4” video, the API returns the
video labels “Animal,” “Wildlife,” “Zoo,” “Terrestrial ani-
mal,” “Nature,” “Tourism,” and “Tourist destination,” which
are consistent with the video content.
We then downloaded the sample videos and modify
them. For manipulating the videos, we select an image, dif-
ferent from the video content, and insert it, periodically and
at a very low rate, into the videos. Figure 2 shows the four
images that were used for image insertion attack, namely, a
car, a building, a food plate and a laptop. The schematic of
the image insertion attack is illustrated in Figure 1. At the
end, we stored the manipulated videos on the Google cloud
storage and used them as inputs to the API. 1
Our experimental results show that if we insert an im-
age periodically once every two seconds and in appropriate
places, the API completely fails to correctly understand the
video content and annotates it as if the video was only about
the inserted image. Note that the image insertion rate is very
low. That is, for a typical frame rate of 25, we insert only
one image per 50 video frames, resulting in an image inser-
tion rate of 0.02. Therefore, the modification to the video is
hardly noticeable. Moreover, we tested the API with videos
with different frame rates and verified that the attack is suc-
cessful, regardless of the choice of the frame rate.
Table 1 provides the API’s output for the video labels
(the table shows only the label with the highest confidence
1The experiments are performed on the interface of the Cloud Video
Intelligence API’s website on Mar. 24, 2017.
score). As can be seen, regardless of the video content,
the API returns a video label, with a very high confidence
score, that exactly matches the corresponding inserted im-
ages. Figure 3 shows the results in more details, provid-
ing the screenshots of the video annotations for the sample
video “Animals.mp4” and the four versions, each manipu-
lated with one of the images presented in Figure 2. The
results show that, while the API can accurately annotate
the original video, for the manipulated videos it only out-
puts the labels which are related to the inserted image. Fig-
ures 4 and 5 show similar experiments with the “Google-
Fiber.mp4” and “JaneGoodall.mp4” videos, respectively.
We performed similar experiments for changing the
video shot labels returned by the API. Note that shot la-
bels provide a detailed description of the individual scenes
within the video; therefore, compared to changing the video
labels, it is more challenging to change all the shot labels,
while maintaining a low image insertion rate. However, we
found that by inserting one image per second, resulting in an
image insertion rate of 0.04 for the frame rate of 25, all the
shot labels returned by the API are related to the inserted
image. Figures 6 shows the screenshots of the shot labels
for the original video “Animals.mp4” and the four manipu-
lated versions, each with one of the inserted images. While
the figure shows the results only for one shot, we verified
that the attack succeeds to change all the shot labels to the
labels of inserted image. Moreover, it can be seen that the
proposed image insertion attack completely alters the pat-
tern of the shot changes of the video, returned by the API.
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4. Discussion
Many applications can benefit from automated video
search and summarization. For example, in video surveil-
lance, one needs to search many hours of videos for a spe-
cific event. Also, some Internet platforms, such as YouTube
and Facebook, require to process enormous amounts of
video files every day, for video recommendation and to
block the videos with illegal contents. The Google’s Cloud
Video Intelligence API is designed to enable the developers
to quickly search the video contents, just as text documents.
Hence, it has the potential to transform the video analysis
field to the point that users can search for a particular event
and get related videos along with the exact timings of the
events within the videos.
However, we showed that the API has certain security
weaknesses. Specifically, an adversary can insert an im-
age, periodically and at a very low rate, into the video in
a way that all the generated shot labels are about the in-
serted image. Such vulnerability seriously undermines the
applicability of the API in adversarial environments. For
example, one can upload a manipulated video which con-
tains adversarial images related to a specific event, and the
API wrongly suggests it to users who asked for videos from
the event. Furthermore, an adversary can bypass a video fil-
tering system by inserting a benign image into a video with
illegal contents.
Note that we could deceive the Google’s Cloud Video
Intelligence API, without having any knowledge about the
learning algorithms, video annotation algorithms or the
cloud computing architecture used by the API. That is,
we developed an approach for deceiving the API, by only
querying the system with different inputs. Through experi-
ments, we showed that the attack is consistently successful
with different videos and images. The success of the im-
age insertion attack shows the importance of designing the
system to work equally well in adversarial environments.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that the Google’s Cloud Video
Intelligence API can be easily deceived by an adversary
without compromising the system or having any knowledge
about the specific details of the algorithms used. In essence,
we found that an adversary can slightly manipulate a video
by inserting an image periodically into it, such that the API
returns only the labels that are related to the inserted image.
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(a) Video labels generated by API for the original video.
(b) Video labels of the manipulated video, where an im-
age of a car is inserted once every two seconds.
(c) Video labels of the manipulated video, where an im-
age of a building is inserted once every two seconds.
(d) Video labels of the manipulated video, where an im-
age of a food plate is inserted once every two seconds.
(e) Video labels of the manipulated video, where an im-
age of a laptop is inserted once every two seconds.
Figure 3: The results of the image insertion attack for changing the video labels of the sample video “Animals.mp4,” provided
by the demonstration website of the Google’s Cloud Video Intelligence [14].
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(a) Video labels generated by API for the original video.
(b) Video labels of the manipulated video, where an im-
age of a car is inserted once every two seconds.
(c) Video labels of the manipulated video, where an im-
age of a building is inserted once every two seconds.
(d) Video labels of the manipulated video, where an im-
age of a food plate is inserted once every two seconds.
(e) Video labels of the manipulated video, where an im-
age of a laptop is inserted once every two seconds.
Figure 4: The results of the image insertion attack for changing the video labels of the sample video “GoogleFiber.mp4,”
provided by the demonstration website of the Google’s Cloud Video Intelligence [14].
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(a) Video labels generated by API for the original video.
(b) Video labels of the manipulated video, where an im-
age of a car is inserted once every two seconds.
(c) Video labels of the manipulated video, where an im-
age of a building is inserted once every two seconds.
(d) Video labels of the manipulated video, where an im-
age of a food plate is inserted once every two seconds.
(e) Video labels of the manipulated video, where an im-
age of a laptop is inserted once every two seconds.
Figure 5: The results of the image insertion attack for changing the video labels of the sample video “JaneGoodall.mp4,”
provided by the demonstration website of the Google’s Cloud Video Intelligence [14].
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(a) Shot labels generated by API for the original video.
(b) Shot labels of the manipulated video, where an
image of a car is inserted once every second.
(c) Shot labels of the manipulated video, where an
image of a building is inserted once every second.
(d) Shot labels of the manipulated video, where an
image of a food plate is inserted once every second.
(e) Shot labels of the manipulated video, where an
image of a laptop is inserted once every seconds.
Figure 6: The results of the image insertion attack for changing the shot labels of the sample video “Animals.mp4,” provided
by the demonstration website of the Google’s Cloud Video Intelligence [14]. While the figures shows the results only for one
shot, we verified that the attack succeeds to change all the shot labels to the labels of inserted image. Note that the periodic
image insertion also completely alters the shot changes of the video, returned by the API.
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